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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium
framework where production of consumption goods requires two resource inputs: a pol-
luting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the latter
contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which a¤ects welfare.
There is a specic research sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a
full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths in a decentralized economy.
We go on to study the e¤ects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the
polluting resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental
policy has two main e¤ects; it delays the extraction of the resource and with it the level
of polluting emissions and it reallocates research e¤orts, decreasing the amount put into
"grey" research to the benet of "green" research. Finally, we compute the optimal values
for these tools.
Keywords: polluting non-renewable resources, growth, environmental policy, bias of
technical change.
JEL classication: O32, O41, Q20, Q32
1 Introduction
It is now common knowledge that a majority of the most serious environmental problems
are linked to the use of non-renewable natural resources in production processes. This
negative externality raises several problems. These include: which economic policies allow
the implementation of optimum, what their impact is on the economy, and in particular
on the rate of technical progress? Some of these questions have been addressed in the
literature. Basically, we can distinguish two periods.
During the 1990s, most authors dealt with partial equilibrium models. Concerning
optimal trajectories, Withagen (1994), in particular, shows that current resource consump-
tion should be lower if pollution is to be taken into account. Hence, extraction has to be
postponed. Moreover, Sinclair (1992) shows that an optimal ad valorem tax on the use of
non-renewable resources is decreasing. This point is criticized by Ulph & Ulph (1994), who
believe this result is not generally true, particularly in the case of environmental regen-
eration and extraction costs. Moreover, Hoel & Kverndokk (1996), who do not consider
ad valorem tax, show that the optimal tax increases and then decreases. Finally, some
authors, such as Hoel & Kverndokk (1996) or Tahvonen (1997), consider the possibility of
a non-polluting backstop technology. Here, a key issue is the timing of resource use (on
this question, see also Chakravorty et al. (1997)). Note that, in these articles, both types
of resources are perfect substitutes.
More recently (in the 2000s), problems caused by the use of polluting non-renewable
resources have been addressed in the context of general equilibrium models with endo-
genous growth1. Schou (2000 and 2002) studies two kinds of models -human capital, and
1Several articles consider these questions within the framework of calibrated macroeconomic models:
see, for example, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Popp (2004), Edenhofer et al. (2005) or Gerlagh and Lise
(2005). Moreover, certain authors present analytical or numeric solutions in a partial equilibrium context:
in particular, see Liski and Tahvonen (2004). However, few works present a systematic study of the social
planners optimum, the decentralized equilibrium and economic policies in the framework of a general
equilibrium model.
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R&D driven growth models- in which no environmental policy is required to implement
optimal solutions. Conversely, Grimaud & Rouge (2005) show in a general model with
non-specied functional forms, the utility function in particular, that an environmental
policy is generally needed. The optimal (ad valorem) tax is either increasing or decreasing,
according to the relative strengths of the evolution over time of pollutions marginal dis-
utility and the psychological discount rate. In the particular case of Schou (2000 &2002),
both e¤ects exactly cancel each other, due to the specied functional forms. Whereas
in Schou and Grimaud and Rouge agents, rms or households, are a¤ected by a ow of
pollution, Groth and Schou (2006) consider a model in which total factor productivity
gradually decreases as a result of the accumulated stock of pollution. This corresponds
more to questions associated with the greenhouse e¤ect, and directly follows the partial
equilibrium models quoted above.
In this paper, we consider an economy in which two inputs are simultaneously used
to produce output: a polluting non-renewable resource, for instance fossil fuels, and a
non-polluting input. This second input is produced by means of labour (for a similar type
of input, see Smulders and de Nooij (2003)). Here, we are thinking of carbon-free backstop
technologies such as solar, and we refer to this input as the labour resource2. We have
basically three objectives: rstly, to compare the trajectories of the decentralized laissez-
faire economy to the optimal ones; second, to study the impact of economic policies,
specically R&D and climate policies, on the equilibrium variable, namely the path of
grey resource extraction, the e¤ort put into the production of the green resource, the
e¤ort put into R&D activities and output growth among others; and nally, to compute
the optimal values of the economic policy tools.
To do so, we consider a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth. As we said
2Popp (2005) uses also a model in which total energy is simultaneously produced by fossil fuels and a
carbon-free backstop technology. In his model, this latter input is produced by means of output.
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above, two kinds of resources are used within the production process. The use of the non-
renewable resource (the greyresource) yields a ow of pollution which accumulates in
the atmosphere. As Groth and Schou (2007) do, we consider pollution as a stock, which
could, for example, be green-house gases. This a¤ects the quality of the environment,
which here is a variable in householdsutility. The other resource (the greenresource) is
in an alternative to fossil fuels as we have already mentioned (see for instance Hoel and
Kverndokk (1996), Tahvonen (1997) or Tahvonen and Salo (2001) on this point); how-
ever, this resource does not constitute a perfect substitute, and it is used simultaneously.
Moreover we assume that a specic R&D sector and a specic stock of knowledge are
associated with each of these resources. To do so, we follow Acemoglus work on directed
technical change (e.g. 2002), as has been done elsewhere in recent literature. Smulders
and de Nooij (2003), as well as Andre and Smulders (2004), for instance, introduce this
type of analysis in an endogenous growth model, but they do not take pollution into
account. Hart (2004) also studies an endogenous growth model without non-renewable
resources, but where pollution can be reduced by a type of research which is environment-
ally oriented, contrary to a second type of research, which is labelled ordinary. Thus we
will have two stocks of knowledge. One is associated with the polluting non-renewable
resource (greyknowledge), and the other is associated with the clean labour resource
(greenknowledge); we refer to the relative evolution of the two stocks of knowledge as
the direction of technical change (as in Acemoglu (2002) for instance). Hence, studying
the impact of economic policies on R&D leads us to distinguish the e¤ects on the total
amount of research (quantityof research), and also on the allocation of research inputs
between research sectors (qualityof research) (see also Hart (2004)).
Another key feature of our model is that innovations are not embodied in intermediate
goods, as, for instance, in Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Grimaud and Rouge (2004 and 2005),
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or Popp (2006). Here, we assume that knowledge is directly priced. This allows us
to considerably simplify the calculations within this type of model. In particular, this
enables to conduct a welfare analysis, which is generally not done in models with directed
technical change and intermediate goods (see for instance Acemoglu (2002)). Moreover,
in standard endogenous growth models with intermediate goods, implementation of the
optimum requires two tools aimed at correcting both distortions that stem from aspects
of the structure of research market, namely monopoly power and intertemporal spillover
(see Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2005)). If environmental externalities are added, the problem
becomes very complicated, as is also discussed in Gerlagh & Lise (2005).
In this paper, we rst determine the optimal paths. We provide a complete character-
ization of the dynamics of all variables in the economy; in fact, we study the transition
towards the steady-state. In particular, we describe the optimal resource extraction path,
thus determining the path of pollution accumulation in the atmosphere. We simultan-
eously establish the optimal allocation of e¤ort put into each of the two research sectors.
We go on to study the positive aspects of our analysis through the economys de-
centralized equilibrium properties, which we compare to the optimal ones. The absence of
intermediate goods in the economy leads us to dene a decentralized equilibrium which de-
parts from the standard in the endogenous growth context: because of the non-convexity of
technology, we assume that rms compete in Cournot fashion in markets for consumption
goods.
At the equilibrium, there are three fundamental distortions: the environmental ex-
ternality presented above and two externalities arising from the fact that in each research
sector innovators cannot extract the whole surplus from users of innovations (on this point,
see Jones & Williams (1998) or Popp (2006) for instance). Following Tinbergen (1960),
we thus associate three economic policy tools: an ad valorem tax on the use of the grey
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resource, and two subsidies for both research sectors. Hence, the equilibrium variables
(quantities, prices and their growth rates) are functions of these economic policy instru-
ments. We consider the e¤ects of the policies on the equilibrium variables and we compute
the optimal values for these economic policy tools.
The main results of the paper are the following.
First, we show that there exists one stable unique feasible optimal steady-state. Op-
timal variables tend towards this regime, which corresponds to the optimum in the case
where there is no pollution, or, equally, pollution does not a¤ect welfare. This comes from
the fact that, as the stock of non-renewable resource is fully exhausted in innite time,
the extraction and pollution ows tend to zero asymptotically.
Second, when we compare the optimum and the laissez-faireregimes, we show that
the decentralized economy uses the non-renewable resource too fast, and thus too much
pollution is emitted in the early stages of the process. This conrms a result of Withagen
(1994) who considers a partial equilibrium model in which the stock of pollutants decays at
a constant exogenous rate. At the same time, the equilibrium quantity of research, that is,
the overall research e¤ort, is sub-optimal. Moreover, the e¤ort invested in green research
is always too low, whilst the e¤ort in grey research is too high in the early stages. It is
important to note that this situation in grey research is reversed after a certain period.
The length of this period is inversely correlated to the distortion in the innovation market,
that is, the gap between the price paid by users of an innovation and their marginal
willingness to pay. We also show that the direction of technical change, measured here
as the di¤erence between the growth rates of greenand greyresource stocks (referring
to Acemoglu (2002)), is non optimal as it is too grey-oriented. Finally, decentralized
equilibrium growth is sub-optimal; which means that early generations consume too much
to the detriment of the future generations.
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Third, we determine the e¤ects of the two economic policies. The R&D policy promotes
both types of research e¤ort (green and grey): the quantity and the quality of research
increase. However, the direction of technical change remains unchanged. We also show
that the ows of extraction (and thus of pollution) are also unchanged, as are the dynamics
of the environment. Concerning the e¤ects of the optimal environmental policy, our rst
set of results conrms standard ndings from the previous literature. We show that the
level of tax does not matter, only resulting in rent transfers (as in Sinclair (1992), Grimaud
Rouge (2005) and Groth Schou (2007) for instance). The optimal climate policy, which is
shown to levy a decreasing tax on fossil fuels, will hold back the pace of extraction, and
thus slow down polluting emissions. A simple intuition is that the price of the resource
(including the tax) becomes relatively higher today. Furthermore, we demonstrate that,
as growth rates of resource extraction and green knowledge are increased, this policy
fosters output growth. More precisely, in our model the level of output is lower for early
generations and higher for future ones, as resource extraction is postponed (see Grimaud
Rouge (2005) for a similar result). We show that this results in a loss of welfare for early
generations. The second set of results concerns the impact of the optimal climate policy on
the overall R&D e¤ort and the direction of technical change. It is shown that the quantity
of research is not modied. However, the quality of research is modied: the e¤ort put into
greyresearch decreases, thus beneting greenresearch. In other words, this decreasing
environmental tax steers technical change in the desireddirection. This result has to
be linked to Andre and Smulders (2004) who show, in a model without pollution, that a
decrease in the growth rate of a tax on the non-renewable resource shifts research activity
from "energy-related" to "labour-related" knowledge. Furthermore, we study the impact
of the climate policy on the ratio of green and grey resourcesmarginal productivities,
which we refer to as the bias of technical change (following Acemoglu (2002)). We show
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that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the short-term, and green-biased in the
long-term.
We conclude by determining the optimal values of the economic policy instruments.
Section 2 introduces the model and presents welfare analysis. The equilibrium of the
decentralised economy is studied in Section 3. The e¤ects of economic policies and the
calculation of optimal policy tools are presented in Section 4. Finally, in section 5, we
make some concluding remarks.
2 Model and welfare
2.1 Model
There is a continuum of consumption goods, indexed on the unit interval. Each good j,
j 2 [0; 1], is produced by Nj rms. Each rm nj (nj = 1; :::; Nj) simultaneously produces
good j and performs research. For rm nj , production function of good j is
Ynjt =

(AQtQnjt)
 + (1  )(ARtRnjt)
1= ,  1 <   1 and  2 (0; 1): (1)
Rnjt is the ow of non-renewable resource. The input simultaneously used within the
production process, Qnjt , is produced from labour, as it is mentioned later in the text (see
formula (4)). Hence we refer to it as the labour resource. In that sense, this production
function is very similar to those used in Smulders & de Nooij (2003) or Andre & Smulders
(2004).
AQt and ARt are the stocks of specic knowledge for the two resources. In fact, the
combined use of both resources can be interpreted from the fact that they are imperfect
substitutes (that are used in specic niche markets, see for instance Gerlagh and van der
Zwaan (2003) on this point).
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This CES technology is such that there is some complementarity between each resource
and its associated knowledge. Indeed, since  is lower than 1, @Y=@AQ and @Y=@AR are
increasing functions of Q and R respectively: marginal productivity for any stock of
knowledge is increasing with the use of the associated resource. This is a key assumption
when studying the impact of climate policiy on the direction of technical change (see
section 4.1.2).
Note that  = 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors.
Since  1 <   1,  is positive. Then, following Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p.197), the
non-renewable resource is necessary, that is, Ynjt = 0 if Rnjt = 0, when 0    1, i.e.
 1 <   0. When 1 <  < +1, i.e. 0 <  < 1, it is non-necessary. If  tends to 1 (i.e.
 tends to +1), the production function is linear; when  = 0 (i.e.  = 1), the production
function is Cobb-Douglas; when  tends to  1 (i.e.  tends to 0), it is Leontie¤.
Technologies for production of knowledge are
_AQnjt = QLQnjtAQt, Q > 0; (2)
and
_ARnjt = RLRnjtARt; R > 0: (3)
AQnjt and ARnjt are the stocks of knowledge produced by rm nj , and we have AQt =R 1
0 (
PNj
nj
AQnjt)dj and ARt =
R 1
0 (
PNj
nj
ARnjt)dj.
The ow Qt of labour resource is produced with a quantity lt of labour:
Qt = lt;  > 0: (4)
The non-renewable resource is extracted from an initial nite stock S0. Extraction costs
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are modelled following Andre and Smulders (2004). At each date t, a ow   _St of non-
renewable resource is extracted, and a proportion
Rt =   _St=(1 + t), t > 0; (5)
is supplied on the market, while   _Stt=(1 + t) vanishes. t=(1 + t) is the unit cost of
extraction in terms of resource. We will later on denote by ^t the term _t=(1 + t). If
^t < 0, the unit cost of extraction is decreasing over time, because of technical progress
that increases exploration e¢ ciency. Conversely, ^t can be positive if we consider that
exploitable reserves are getting less accessible despite better drilling results.
The labour resource does not pollute. Pollution is generated by the use of the non-
renewable natural resource within the production process:
Pt = Rt,  > 0: (6)
This ow of pollution (Pt) a¤ects negatively the stock of environment (Et). We assume
Et = E0  
R t
0 Psds, E0 > 0, which gives the following law of motion

Et =  Pt =  Rt: (7)
In the following, we assume that the lower limit to the stock of environment, E0 S0, is
positive. We show below that the resource is asymptotically exhausted, and thus that the
stock of environment tends to its lower limit in the long-run. Hence, since the total quantity
of pollution emitted in the atmosphere is known, the question is, what is the pollution
path, or, in other words, how will pollution be distributed between generations (as in
Grimaud and Rouge (2005)). Note that we do not consider environmental regeneration
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(as it is done in a similar context by Groth and Schou (2007)). If this were to feature in the
model, as well as abatement activities3, it would certainly a¤ect the results. Considering
carbon sequestration, in particular, would lead to a dissociation of the pollution ow and
extraction.
Population is assumed constant, normalized to one, and each individual is endowed
with one unit of labour. Thus we have:
1 = lt + LQt + LRt: (8)
where lt is used for production and (LQt+LRt) for research. Note that LQt =
R 1
0 (
PNj
nj
LQnjt)dj
and LRt =
R 1
0 (
PNj
nj
LRnjt)dj:
The households instantaneous utility function depends both on consumption cjt, j 2
[0; 1], and the stock of environment Et. The intertemporal utility function is:
U =
Z +1
0

ln(
Z 1
0
c"jtdj)
1=" + ! lnEt

e tdt; 0 < " < 1;  > 0 and ! > 0: (9)
where cjt = Yjt =
PNj
nj
Ynjt, that is, the whole production of good j is consumed by
the representative household.
2.2 Welfare
We now characterize the optimum, that is, the solution of the social planners program
(we give more details in Appendix 1). Moreover, we consider the symmetric case in
which consumption good sectors and rms are identical. In this case, we have Nj = N ,
Ynj = Y=N , Qnj = Q=N , Rnj = R=N , LQnj = LQ=N , and LRnj = LR=N . The results
are given in proposition 14; using these results and the phase diagram given in gure 1,
3We thank one anonymous referee for this remark.
4Proposition 1 only features the growth rates of R, E, Y , AQ and AR. If we look for analytical solutions,
the only way to compute the optimal levels of these variables, that is, the functions of time R(t), E(t),
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we fully characterize the optimal transitional dynamics of the economy. We drop time
subscripts for notational convenience.
Proposition 1 At the social optimum, quantities and rates of growth take the following
values (upper-script o is used for optimum, and gX is the rate of growth of any variable
X ):
lo =

Q
; Qo = lo; (10)
LoQ =
R(Q   )
Q(Q + R)
+
goR
Q + R
; (11)
LoR =
Q   
Q + R
  g
o
R
Q + R
; (12)
goR =    ^

1  (Q + R)R
Q
Z +1
t
(!=E)e (s t)ds

  !(Q + R)
Q
goE ; (13)
goY = QL
o
Q: (14)
goAQ = QL
o
Q; g
o
AR
= RL
o
R; and g
o
AQ
  goAR = goR. (15)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
First of all, note that, if ! = 0, which corresponds to the case where households are
indi¤erent to the state of environment, the economy immediately jumps to its steady-state
(that is, an economy in which all rates of growth are constant). Indeed, in this case we
have goR =     ^ (see (13)), which is constant if we assume that ^ is constant. Thus,
transitional dynamics of the model stem from the introduction of the stock of environment
(Et).
Y (t) among others, would be to use the initial conditions E(0) = E0 and S(0) = S0 (where E0 and S0 are
given positive constants) and the condition S0 =
R +1
0
(1+ t)R
o
tdt. It is very di¢ cult (maybe impossible)
to compute such solutions, in particular because of the complexity of the di¤erential equation giving the
optimal growth rate of resource extraction. However, we think that the phase diagram (Figure 1) together
with the trajectories presented in Figure 2 give several indications on these optimal variables. One possible
way to go further in the analysis would be to perform a numerical analysis.
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Let us now study the dynamics of the optimum, in the particular case where ^ = 0
(i.e. constant extraction costs) for computational convenience.
From (7), _Eo =  Ro, one gets goE =  Ro=Eo. Log-di¤erentiating with respect to
time, we have _goE=g
o
E = g
o
R   goE , or _goE = goE(goR   goE). Let us study the evolution of the
environments growth rate over time. Plugging (13) (where ^ = 0) into _goE = g
o
E(g
o
R  goE)
gives the following Ricatti di¤erential equation : _goE =  (1+!(Q+R)=Q)(goE)2 goE . In
order to transform this equation into a linear rst-order di¤erential equation, we consider
the new variable z = 1=goE , which implies _z =   _goE=(goE)2. The Ricatti equation becomes
_z = (1 + !(Q + R)=Q) + z, whose solution leads to
goE =
1
et

1=goE0 + (Q + !(Q + R))=Q
  (Q + !(Q + R))=Q : (16)
In order to construct a phase diagram, recall that we have goR =    (!(Q+ R)=Q)goE
(see (13) when ^ = 0). Moreover, from _goE = g
o
E(g
o
R   goE) (which we obtained above), we
get _goE  0 and _goR  0 if goR  goE . Similarly, _goE  0 and _goR  0 if goR  goE .
Before studying this phase diagram, we need to make two preliminary remarks. First,
the ow of extraction is strictly positive at each date t. Indeed, if   0, that is,   1, the
resource is necessary, i.e. output is nil when R = 0. If  > 0, that is,  > 1, the resource
is non-necessary, but lim
R!0
@Y=@R = +1. This means that the conditions for proposition
5in Dasgupta and Heal (1974, footnote 1, page 15) to hold are fullled; hence Rt > 0 for
all t  0.
Second, the stock of non-renewable resource is fully depleted. This is shown by the
following. At each date t, extracting one unit of grey resource has two e¤ects; production,
and thus consumption increase, but at the same time the environment is harmed. There-
fore utility is a¤ected in two opposite ways: the rst e¤ect increases the current level of
utility, whereas the second diminishes utility levels from t to innity. One can verify that
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the rst e¤ect, (@Yt=@Rt)=Yt, tends to innity as Rt tends to zero, whereas the second one
is bounded5. Indeed, the marginal disutility of resource extraction (and thus pollution) is
bounded since the level of the environment is bounded. Formally, this e¤ect is given byR +1
t (!=Es)(dEs=dRt)e
 (s t)ds, where dEs=dRt =  , and 1=Es < 1=(E0   S0) since
E0  S0 is the positive lower limit of the environment, reached when the resource is fully
depleted. Finally, we get 0 >
R +1
t (!=Es)(dEs=dRt)e
 (s t)ds >  !=(E0 S0). These
formulae are the ones presented in Appendix 1 (see (33) when 'S = 0).
Let us now study the phase diagram depicted in gure 1. There are two steady-states.
The rst one is unstable, and it occurs when goE0 = g
o
R0 =  Q=(Q + !(Q + R)):
this corresponds to J in the phase diagram. Along this steady-state, _E remains strictly
positive as t tends to innity. This is impossible, since lim
t!+1Rt = 0. Therefore, this
steady-state can be ruled out6. In addition, we can also eliminate the path JK. Indeed,
since gR is alternately negative and positive along this path, the stock of resource is fully
exhausted in nite time. This contradicts what is stated above.
The second steady-state, I in gure 1, is stable, and the economy tends towards it if
goE0 >  Q=(Q+!(Q+R)): This limit regime corresponds to the case in which optimal
extraction Ro, and thus optimal pollution, P o = Ro, tend to zero. Hence _Eo also tends
to zero. This corresponds to the "laisser-faire" case (see section 3).
Let us now give some details about the transition towards this regime. Our rst
comments are based on Figure 1. We can see that the growth rate of resource extraction,
goR, is unambiguously negative. Moreover this rate decreases over time and asymptotically
tends towards its lower limit   (which is the level of this rate in the case of no pollution).
This means that, though this di¤erence decreases over time, the optimal growth rate of
5 In some cases, the resource may not be fully depleted. For instance, if it is non-necessary for production
and if its marginal productivity is bounded from above (on this point, see for instance Gerlagh and Keyzer
(2004)).
6We thank one anonymous referee for this remark.
13
resource extraction is always higher than the "no-pollution" one. Thus, the fact that
the production process pollutes and a¤ects welfare implies that it is optimal to postpone
resource extraction. That is less grey resource is used today, and more tomorrow. This
results conrms the ndings of Withagen (1994, p.241) in a partial equilibrium framework
with no growth.
On the other hand, the optimal growth rate of the stock of environment, goE , which
is also unambiguously negative (see (7)), increases over time and tends towards zero, its
obvious upper limit. Indeed, the ow of pollution becomes nil in a distant future, as the
grey resource gets exhausted. For this reason, the state of the environment decays more
and more slowly.
Proposition 1 shows that the dynamics of goR and g
o
E have a direct impact on the
ows of labour devoted to research and the growth rate of the economy. From (11) and
(12), we can see that pollution leads the social planner to devote more e¤ort to green
research (LoQ); and less to grey research (L
o
R). Along the transitional path, L
o
Q decreases
and LoR increases, both converging towards their "no-pollution" levels. At the same time,
equation (14) shows that the economys growth rate is higher in the pollution case, as goR
is also higher (see above). Then goY decreases over time, to eventually converge towards
its no-pollution level.
display Figure 1 here
Dynamics of the optimal (social planners program) and decentralized equilibrium
paths are fully depicted in Figure 2: see section 3.2.
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3 Equilibrium in the decentralized economy
Let us now turn to the decentralized economy, and in particular the way we model innov-
ation activities.
In contrast with the standard endogenous growth literature, in our model new pieces of
knowledge are not embedded in intermediate goods. They are directly used by rms and
protected by innitely-lived patents (that is, directly priced). As knowledge is a public
good, there are two main di¢ culties in funding it. First, it is di¢ cult to extract from
agents their total willingness to pay for the use of that knowledge (see for instance Popp
(2004)); according to Jones andWilliams (1998), investments in R&D in the US are at least
two to four times lower than their optimal level. We therefore introduce two exogenous
parameters  Q and  R (see section 3.2), which represent the gap between the willingness
to pay and the price of innovations in both research sectors as received by sellers (these
parameters will be interpreted as subsidies to R&D later in the text). A second di¢ culty
arises because the technologies of rms using knowledge as a productive factor are non-
convex (see formulas (1), (2) and (3)). In a perfectly competitive environment, prots
for these rms would be negative and a general competitive equilibrium would not exist.
We therefore assume imperfect competition (à la Cournot) in markets for consumption
goods. By selling these goods at a price which is higher than the marginal cost, rms gain
resources that allow them to buy knowledge.
There are four basic distortions with respect to the social planners program. First, the
ow of pollution, Pt, which damages the stock of environment; second, the two distortions
in markets for innovations mentioned above; and, nally, the Cournot competition in
the markets for consumption goods. This latter distortion will be shown not to prevent
decentralized equilibrium variables to be optimal (see section 3.2.2 below). Hence we
introduce three economic tools: a tax on the polluting resource, and two subsidies to
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research.
3.1 Agentsbehaviour
Wage is normalized to one: wt = 1, and pjt, pQt, pRt and rt are, respectively, the price of
consumption good j, the price of the labour and non-renewable resources, and the interest
rate on a perfect nancial market. We drop time subscripts for notational convenience.
Household
The representative household maximizes (9) subject to her budget constraint _b =
rb + w +    R 10 pjcjdj + T , where b is her total wealth,  represents total prots in the
economy and T is a lump-sum subsidy (or tax). Recall that we normalized w to 1. One
gets the two following standard results (details are given in Appendix 2). Total demand
for good j is
cj = p
1=(" 1)
j 
; (17)
where 
 = (
R 1
0 pkckdk)=(
R 1
0 p
"=(" 1)
k dk), and Ramsey-Keynes condition is
r = + (1  ")gcj + g  + gpj , with j 2 [0; 1]; (18)
where   =
R 1
0 c
"
jdj.
Labour resource sector:
The prot of the rm is Q = pQl   l. Perfect competition leads to
pQ = 1=: (19)
Non-renewable resource sector:
On the competitive natural resource market, the maximization of the prot functionR +1
t pRsRse
  R st rududs, subject to _Ss =  (1 + s)Rs, Ss  0, Rs  0, s  t, yields the
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standard equilibrium Hotelling rule:
_pR
pR
= r + ^. (20)
Equation (20) states that the owners net rent, _pR=pR  ^, is equal to the interest rate. In
particular, note that if ^ < 0 (if technical progress increases access to exploitable resource
stocks) one gets _pR=pR < r. The case where _pR=pR < 0 can even occur (if the decrease in
extraction costs is fast enough). As usual, the transversality condition is limt!+1 St = 0.
Firms
Recall that rms have two activities: rst, each one produces and sells a di¤erentiated
good on an imperfect market. Second, it produces and sells innovations which we assume
traded using bilateral contracts between inventors and users.
VQt and VRt are the prices of one innovation at date t in the two research sectors. Let us
denote by ~njt prot of rm nj without payment of knowledge. At each moment, rm nj
maximizes ~njt = pjtYnjt pQtQnjt (1+t)pRtRnjt+VQt _AQnjt+VRt _ARnjt LQnjt LRnjt,
subject to (1), (2), (3) and (17), where t is the unit tax on resource use. Henceforth, we
will denote  t = 1 + t for computational convenience. After substitutions, one gets the
following program:
max ~nj = Ynj [

1 "(
NjX
nk=1
Ynk)
" 1]  pQQnj   pRRnj + VQQLQnjAQ
+VRRLRnjAR   LQnj   LRnj
subject to Ynj =

(AQQnj )
 + (1  )(ARRnj )a
1= ,
The rst order conditions with respect to Ynj , Qnj , Rnj , LQnj , and LRnj are respect-
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ively ( is the Lagrange multiplier):

1 "(
NjX
nk=1
Ynk)
" 1 + ("  1)Ynj
1 "(
NjX
nk=1
Ynk)
" 2 = : (21)
This equation implicitely yields the best response of rm nj to the choice of production
of the other rms on the market of consumption good j.
pQ = Y
1 
nj A

QQ
 1
nj (22)
pR = (1  )Y 1 nj ARR 1nj (23)
VQQAQ = 1 (24)
VRRAR = 1: (25)
The willingnesses to pay for pieces of knowledges AQ and AR at each date t respectively
are
vQnj = @~nj=@AQ = VQQLQnj + Y
1 
nj A
 1
Q Q

nj (26)
and
vRnj = @~nj=@AR = VRRLRnj + (1  )Y 1 nj A 1R Rnj : (27)
Both formulas are composed of two parts. Each piece of knowledge being simultaneously
used by research and production activities, these parts correspond to the respective will-
ingnesses to pay. We recover, here, the public good nature of knowledge inside the rm.
3.2 Decentralized equilibrium
Here, an equilibrium is a set of proles of quantities and prices, such that: the representat-
ive household maximizes utiliy and rms maximize prots; labour, resource and nancial
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markets are perfectly competitive; on each consumption good market, there is Cournot
competition; pieces of knowledge are traded using bilateral contracts. We focus on a sym-
metric decentralized equilibrium (where, as in section 2.2, consumption good sectors and
rms are identical).
3.2.1 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From (22) and (26) we get vQnj = VQQLQnj + pQQnj=AQ = VQQLQnj + lnj=AQ. We
also obtain from (23) and (27) vRnj = VRRLRnj + pRRnj=AR. Summing on nj and
j, we get the total willingness to pay for one unit of "green" knowledge at date t, vQ =
VQQLQ + l=AQ, and the total willingness to pay for grey knowledge at date t, vR =
VRRLR + pRR=AR. These correspond to the social values of innovations in the green
and grey sectors, respectively.
From now on we assume that, due to information and excludability problems, rms
are unable to extract the whole willingnesses to pay for knowledge. We assume that they
only extract a part v, that corresponds to the market value of an innovation. In order to
avoid heavy computations, we consider that extracted (i.e., market) values for one unit
of knowledge are: vQ = VQQLQ +  Ql=AQ, and vR = VRRLR +  RpRR=AR, where
 i 2 [0; 1] for i = Q;R. This assumption can be interpreted as follows: innovators are
able to fully observe the social value of innovations in the research activity, but not in
the production activity. Moreover, in the following, we will interpret an increase in  i
as an economic policy aiming at fostering one sector of research. Finally, unit prices
paid for green and grey knowledge respectively are VQt =
R +1
t vQse
  R st rududs and VRt =R +1
t vRse
  R st rududs. Di¤erentiating, one gets the standard following formula:
rt =
_VQt
VQt
+
vQt
VQt
=
_VRt
VRt
+
vRt
VRt
; (28)
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which says that the rate of return is the same on the nancial market as well as on the
two research sectors.
Since we are in the symmetric case (in particular we have Ynj = Yj=N = Y=N and
pj = p), equation (21) becomes p [1 + ("  1)=N ] = . Using (22) and (23), one gets
p [1 + ("  1)=N ] = pQY  1A Q Q1 = = pRY  1A R R1 =(1  ). (29)
Since " < 1, this equation means that the price of any consumption good is higher than
its marginal cost. Indeed, second and third terms represent the marginal costs when using
the green and grey resources respectively. This gap between price and marginal cost allows
rms to buy knowledge despite the non-convexity of technology. Observe that, if N = 1
(monopolistic case), (29) becomes p = (marginal cost)=", which is the standard result.
Before we depict the general equilibrium in proposition 2, let us present a preliminary
result.
Lemma: The following e¢ ciency condition holds at each date t:
AQtQt
ARtRt
=

 R(1  )R
 QQ
1=
. (30)
This condition means that marginal productivity of labour is the same in both R&D
sectors. Note that it holds at optimum also (see (41) below in Appendix 1).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
We now present the equilibrium of the decentralized economy in proposition 27:
Proposition 2 At the decentralized equilibrium, quantities and rates of growth take the
7As for the optimum, we have E(0) = E0, S(0) = S0 and S0 =
R +1
0
(1 + t)R
e
tdt.
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following values (upper-script e is used for equilibrium):
le =

 QQ
; Qe = le;
LeQ =
R   
Q + R
  R
 QQ(Q + R)
  ^+ g
Q + R
;
LeR =
Q + 
Q + R
  
 Q(Q + R)
+
^+ g
Q + R
;
Ee = E0 +
Re0
+ ^+ g
h
e (+^+g )t   1
i
:
geR =    ^  g ;
geY = QL
e
Q;
geAQ = QL
e
Q; g
e
AR
= RL
e
R; and g
e
AQ
  geAR = geR.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Observe that the growth rate of the environmental tax has an impact on the equilib-
rium variables, whereas a change in the tax level only results in rent transfers (see also for
instance Sinclair (1992), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Grimaud and Rouge (2005))8.
Moreover, if g is independant of time, and in particular if g = 0, there are no trans-
itional dynamics in the decentralized equilibrium; nevertheless, note that Ee progressively
decreases over time.
3.2.2 Decentralized equilibrium vs. social optimum
Assume that research is optimally funded ( Q =  R = 1) and that the optimal envir-
onmental policy is implemented, i.e. g = go (the value of g
o
 is given in Proposition 4
8Remark that no equilibrium variable depends on  R. This can be explained as follows. Recall that
 R only appears in the second term of the total willingness to pay for one unit of grey knowledge: see
paragraph 3 in section 3.2. Basically, the equilibrium only determines the product  RpR. Thus a change
in  R has an e¤ect which is similar to a change in the level of the environmental tax  , that is, only a rent
transfer from the owner of the resource towards the government.
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below). Then, the equilibrium paths are similar to the optimal ones: all conditions given
in Propositions 1 and 2 are identical, under the initial conditions E(0) = E0, S(0) = S0
and S0 =
R +1
0 (1 + t)R
e
tdt. This means that all the variables of the model are identical
at each date t in the social planner regime and the decentralized economy. Observe that
this holds despite the assumption of Cournot competition in di¤erentiated goodsmarkets.
Indeed, the mark-up in these markets entails a real wage lower than the walrasian one, but
it does not prevent the optimum being reached. In this model there is only one represent-
ative household, who perceives two kinds of income: wages and prots. Since her labour
supply is exogenous by assumption, when the real wage diminishes, total production is
unchanged. Thus the households total income is unchanged as the increase in her prots
cancels the wage cut. So, her behavior in terms of consumption and savings is not modi-
ed and the general equilibrium of the economy is not a¤ected. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, Ch. 6, p. 234) obtain a similar result in the context of a monopoly pricing of
consumer goods: in their context also, as labour supply is exogenous, the equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal.
This underlines the fact that there are only three distortions preventing the economy
achieving the social optimum: the possible inability of rms to extract the whole willing-
ness to pay for knowledge in the two R&D sectors, and the environmental problem.
Let us now compare the equilibrium paths to the optimal ones. In Figure 2, equilibrium
paths are represented by dashed lines, and these are shown with the optimal paths studied
above (in section 2.2). Note that we assume g = 0 and ^ = 0 (i.e., no environmental
policy and constant extraction cost) in this gure. When  Q = 1, that is, when green
research is fully funded, the only remaining distortion is the environmental one. Figure
2 shows that, in the long-run, the decentralized equilibrium tends to be socially optimal.
Indeed, the environmental problem vanishes in the long-run since pollution ows tend to
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zero as the stock of resource is progressively exhausted.
Studying the depicted equilibrium paths shows the following, which complements the
comments made in section 2.2. The equilibrium growth rate of resource extraction (geR =
 ) is too low with respect to the optimal rate: extraction (and thus pollution) has to
be delayed, especially in early stages, when the gap is maximal. Labour devoted to green
research (LeQ) is too low (especially for the rst generations here also); the lower  Q
(increase in the R&D distortion), the bigger the gap is. Simultaneously, when  Q = 1,
the e¤ort invested in grey research (LeR) is initially too high, and this over-investment in
grey research tends to zero when t tends to innity. If  Q < 1, early generations over-
invest in grey research (as previously), but future generations devote a sub-optimal e¤ort
to this research. Finally, output growth needs to be fostered (especially when there is
a distortion in R&D sectors). Comments about the e¤ects of economic policies given in
section 4 provide further insight into these results.
Remark: Extraction costs (^) have the same e¤ect on equilibrium values as a change
in g . In particular, if ^ is negative (technical progress), then equilibrium extraction is
postponed. Indeed, because resource price increasing slows (see equation (20)), rms delay
their use of this resource. We exhaustively describe the e¤ects of a change in g (and thus
of ^) in the next section.
display Figure 2 here
4 Economic policies
4.1 Impact of economic policy and direction of technical change
Here we want to study the impact of an economic policy consisting of a subsidy to green
research (an increase in  Q) as well as an environmental policy (a change in g ).
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Proposition 3 The e¤ects of the economic policy are depicted in table 1.
LeQ L
e
R l
e geR g
e
Y = g
e
AQ
geAR g
e
AQ
  geAR geVQ geVR
@
@ Q
> 0 > 0 < 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 < 0
@
@g
< 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Table 1: e¤ects of economic policy
Proof. The results given in the rst seven columns directly follow from formulas in
proposition 2. The results in the last two columns are easily derived from (24) and (25),
since one gets geVQ =  geAQ and geVR =  geAR .
Let us now give some comments about results presented in proposition 3.
4.1.1 E¤ects of R&D policy
An increase in  Q, that is, an increase in the subsidy to green research leads to intuitive
results. This reallocates labour among production (le decreases) and research (LeQ and L
e
R
increase). Thus economic growth is fostered (since geY = g
e
AQ
= QL
e
Q).
This policy has no e¤ect on the extraction rate (geR remains unchanged). Since g
e
P = g
e
R,
from (6), it has no e¤ect on the rate of pollution emission either. As the pollution path is
not modied, the environment is not a¤ected (Et remains unchanged for all t).
Recall that geY = g
e
AQ
+ geQ = g
e
AR
+ geR (see (45) in Appendix 2). Since g
e
Q = 0, we
have geAQ   geAR = geR. So, this economic policy fosters both research sectors, but it does
not modify the direction of technical progress (i.e., geAQ   geAR).
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4.1.2 E¤ects of environmental policy
As we show in the next section, the optimal growth rate of the environmental tax is
generally negative. For this reason, let us study the impact of a decrease in g , which we
interpret as a more stringent environmental policy. We already know that a decreasing
unit tax delays resource extraction (and thus polluting emissions) (see for instance Sinclair
(1992)). We show in what follows that we obtain a similar result. Moreover, we prove
that such a policy has environment friendly e¤ects on the direction of technical change,
namely, a rise in the growth rate of green knowledge, and a decrease in the growth rate of
grey knowledge.
Impact on the paths of resource extraction and pollution emission Table 1
shows that a decrease in g entails an increase in geR = g
e
P . The mechanism can be
described as follows.
Since r =  (see Appendix 2), observe that gpR = g + r + ^ decreases, that is,
current values of pR (the price paid by the consumption goods rms) increase relative to
its future values. In other words, the non-renewable resource gets more expensive today
and cheaper tomorrow. For this reason, the resource is extracted less rapidly (less today
and more tomorrow): geR (and thus g
e
P ) increases. Hence, resource extraction (and thus
pollution emission) is delayed, as is the case in Sinclair (1992), Grimaud and Rouge (2005)
and Groth and Schou (2007), for instance. Note that this rst impact has a positive e¤ect
on output growth.
Impact on the direction and bias of technical change Table 1 shows that a decrease
in g entails an increase in geAQ   geAR . This results can be linked to Andre an Smulders
(2004) (in a model without pollution). What follows gives intuitions about this result.
We have already shown that if g decreases, then geR increases, that is, the extraction
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ow decreases in the short-run, and increases in the long-run. The initial decrease in Re
entails a decrease in the marginal productivity of specic knowledge AeR. Indeed, A
e
R and
Re are complementary in the nal sector (see comments below equation (1)); this implies
that the rate of return in grey research (((1   ) RRl=)(AeRRe=AeQQe) : see proof
of the Lemma in Appendix 2) decreases since it is an increasing function of Re. Thus,
investing in the grey R&D sector becomes less protable, which yields a reallocation of
labour among sectors. Less e¤ort is devoted to the grey sector, and more to the green one:
LeR decreases and L
e
Q increases (recall that l is constant). Therefore, g
e
AR
decreases and
geAQ increases. Finally, g
e
AQ
  geAR increases, that is, technical progress is directed towards
green knowledge.
Note that all these e¤ects are reversed in the long run, as values of Re get higher in
a distant future. However, the short-term e¤ect outweights this long-term one because of
intertemporal discounting.
In Table 1, a decrease in g yields a decrease in geVQ and an increase in g
e
VR
. We
can give the following intuition about these equilibrium results. Since a more stringent
environmental policy leads to an increase in geAQ , the unit cost of green innovations (i.e.,
@LQ=@ _AQ = 1=QAQ) decreases faster. Prots being nil in research activities, the price
of green innovations decreases faster also. The same argument applies to grey knowledge:
a more stringent environmental policy entails a slower decrease in the unit cost of grey
innovations, and thus in their prices also. Formally, from (24) and (25), one has geVQ =
 geAQ  0 and geVR =  geAR  0.
Finally, let us study the impact on the ratio of marginal productivities, noted FQ=FR,
that we call the bias of technical change (in reference to Acemoglu (2002)). First, from
(1), we have FQ=FR = (=(1  ))(AeQ=AeR)(Re=Qe)1 
= (=(1  ))(AeQ0=AeR0)(1=Qe)1 (Re0)1  exp
h
(geAQ   geAR) + (1  )geR
i
t
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= (=(1   ))(AeQ0=AeR0)(1=Qe)1 (Re0)1  exp geRt, since geAQ   geAR = geR. A more
stringent climate policy (a decrease in g ) has di¤erent e¤ects in the short and in the
long-term. Indeed, it results in a decrease in Re0 and an increase in exp g
e
Rt for t > 0 (see
above). When t = 0, the only remaining e¤ect is the former one. Thus, climate policy
entails lower values of FQ=FR: environmental policy is grey-biased in the short-term (this
result holds in a neighborood of t = 0). If t is large, the latter e¤ect dominates the former:
FQ=FR increases. Hence, environmental policy is green-biased in the long-run.
To sum up, we can classify the e¤ects of the environmental policy into two types:
growth and green e¤ects.
Growth e¤ects: A decrease in g fosters the economys growth: indeed positive
impacts on geR and g
e
AQ
in the same way yield an increase in geY . Note that, as we show in
the following subsection, this means lower output levels for current generations and higher
levels in the future.
Green e¤ects: We distinguish two di¤erent green e¤ects. First, geR increases: resource
extraction, and thus pollution, is delayed. The second e¤ect concerns the allocation of
labour among the di¤erent R&D sectors of the economy. As we have seen, labour is
transferred from the polluting resource R&D sector to the green one. This modies the
direction of technological change: it becomes more green-oriented.
4.1.3 Utility levels
The intertemporal utility of an economy shifting from a laissez-faire equilibrium to the
social planner regime unambiguously increases. Nevertheless, the impact is not the same
on all generations. Recall that the instantaneous utility function, ln(
R 1
0 c
"
jtdj)
1=" + ! lnEt
(see equation (9)), is an increasing function of the ow of consumption and the stock
of environment; moreover consumption, i.e. production, is an increasing function of two
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inputs: AQQ and ARR (see equation (1)).
Let us consider a laissez-faire equilibrium. Let us suppose that the economic policies
presented above, namely an increase in  Q and a negative g , are implemented at date
0. As  Q increases, the e¤ort put into the production of the green resource, l
e
0, decreases
(see Table 1). As a result, QeO = l
e
0 also decreases. Simultaneously, Table 1 shows that a
decrease in g yields an increase in geRt for all t. This results in a decrease in R
e
0. The stocks
E0, AQ0 and AR0 being unchanged, such economic policy unambiguously yields a decrease
in Y e0 . Henceforth, the instantaneous utility of the present generation diminishes. We can
infer that the more the adjustment of the three stocks is progressive -which depens on
the exogenous parameters of the model-, the more generations whose instantaneous utility
decline following the rst one will be numerous.
This means that the economic policy scheme presented here results in a loss of welfare
for the rst generations.
4.2 Basic environmental externality and optimal policy
Comparing values in propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the following result which gives the
design of optimal policy instruments.
Proposition 4 If  Q =  R = 1 (optimal nancing of research) and g =  ^B +
!(Q+R)
Q
goE  go , where B =
h
(Q + R)R
R +1
t (!=E)e
 (s t)ds
i
=Q, then the decent-
ralized equilibrium path is socially optimal.
A detailed interpretation of go is given in Appendix 3. In what follows, we present the
main intuitions.
The optimal rate of growth of the pollution tax, given in proposition 4, is the social
value of delaying an extraxted quantity corresponding to one unit of consumption good
(i.e. Rt =  1=(@Yt=@Rt)), and thus delaying pollution, from t to t + t (that is,
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Rt+t =  Rt). This social value is expressed in terms of good Y , and in absolute
value.
If ^ = 0 (constant unit cost of extraction), go = [!(Q + R)=Q] g
o
E , which is negative
since goE is negative (see Proposition 1 and Figure 2): the optimal policy delays extrac-
tion (as in Sinclair (1992)). The basic mechanism is the following. Let us assume that
extraction is reduced at time t, and that it is increased at t+t. Environment (and thus
welfare) is not modied on the two intervals ] 1; t[ and ]t; +1[. On the reverse, it is
improved on segment [t; t+t]. That is the basic environmental externality of the model.
Note that if we assumed environmental regeneration, or considered carbon sequestration,
this would possibly change this result.
Note that Proposition 1 presents the rst best. One could think of cases in which
only a second best is achievable. For instance,  Q =  R = 1 may be impossible, because
of government resource constraints or observability issues, as in Gerlagh, Kverndokk and
Rosendahl (2007). In this case, the optimal rate of growth of the environmental tax would
di¤er from go given in Proposition 4, and would explicitly depend on the research policy
9.
In Gerlagh, Kverndokk and Rosendahl, for instance, the optimal level of the environmental
tax is higher than the Pigouvian level.
Remark: Let us consider the case where ^ 6= 0. The term ^B in go is the change
in utility for generations between t and +1 if one delays extraction from t to t + t.
If ^ < 0, this utility decreases. Indeed, in this case, technical progress on extraction
costs fosters extraction and thus pollution for future generations. This result has two
contrary e¤ects on the welfare of future generations: on the one hand, more extracted
resource means more production. On the other hand, it also means more pollution. Here,
technical progress is harmful in terms of environment for future generations. In the limit
case ^ < [!(Q + R)=QB] goE , which corresponds to a high level of technical progress
9We thank Reyer Gerlagh for this remark.
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in extraction, one gets go > 0. Contrary to the standard view which recommends that
resource extraction be postponed, we are here in the case in which extraction has to be
accelerated.
5 Conclusion
We have presented an endogenous growth model in which consumption goods are produced
by means of two inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour
resource. A specic research sector and a corresponding stock of knowledge are associated
with each resource. The use of the non-renewable resource yields polluting emissions
which damage the stock of environment, and this is harmful to households utility. We
have determined the social planners optimal regime, which consists of a transition towards
a stable unique optimal steady-state. We have also studied the properties of the economys
decentralized equilibrium, and have compared them to the optimal properties.
We have shown that the non-renewable resource is used too fast in the "laissez-faire"
regime, and thus too much pollution is emitted in the early stages of the process. The
overall research e¤ort is lower than its optimal level; in fact, the e¤ort put into green
research is always too low, whilst that into grey research is too high in the early stages.
Moreover, the direction of technical change is too grey-orientedand the economys growth
is sub-optimal, which means that early generations consume too much.
We have studied the impact of three economic policy tools: two subsidies to research
(green and grey) and an environmental tax on the non-renewable resource. Both types
of research e¤ort (green and grey) are fostered by the R&D policy which, however, has
no impact on the direction of technical change, on the ows of extraction (and thus of
pollution), or the dynamics of the environment. The optimal environmental policy, which
consists of a decreasing tax on fossil fuels, will hold back the pace of extraction, and
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thus slow down polluting emissions. This results from the fact that the price of the
resource (including the tax) becomes relatively higher today. Furthermore, this policy
fosters output growth, which entails a loss of welfare for early generations. Moreover, the
environmental policy has no e¤ect on the quantity of research but it modies the quality
of research: the e¤ort put into greyresearch decreases, thus beneting greenresearch.
We also showed that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the short-term, and green-
biased in the long-term. Finally, we determined the optimal values of the economic policy
instruments employed.
Future lines of research could consider some cases in which the grey resource is not fully
exhausted. One could also introduce regeneration into the law of motion of the environ-
ment. This, however, would modify the optimal trajectories and make interpretation and
determination of the optimal tax more complex. Finally, considering carbon sequestration
would allow us to dissociate resource extraction and polluting emissions.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Welfare
Let us consider the symmetric case in which Nj = N , Ynj = Y=N , Qnj = Q=N , Rnj =
R=N , LQnj = LQ=N , and LRnj = LR=N . Then technologies (1), (2) and (3) become
Y = [(AQQ)
 + (1  )(ARR)a]1=, _AQ = QLQAQ; and _AR = RLRAR: Utility is now
U =
R +1
0 (ln ct + ! lnEt)e
 tdt: The social planner maximizes U subject to the modied
versions of (1), (2) and (3), and (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). The Hamiltonian of the program
is
H = f 1

ln[(AQl)
 + (1  )(ARR)a] + ! lnEge t + 'QQ(1  l   LR)AQ
+'RRLRAR   'S(1 + )R  'ER:
The rst order conditions @H=@l = 0, @H=@LR = 0 and @H=@R = 0 yield
Y  AQl
 1e t   'QQAQ = 0 (31)
 'QQAQ + 'RRAR = 0 (32)
Y  (1  )ARR 1e t   'S(1 + )  'E = 0: (33)
Moreover, @H=@AQ =   _'Q, @H=@AR =   _'R; @H=@S =   _'S ; and @H=@E =   _'E yield
_'Q
'Q
=
 Y  (l)A 1Q e t
'Q
  Q(1  l   LR); (34)
_'R
'R
=
 Y  (1  )RA 1R e t
'R
  RLR; (35)
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  _'S = 0; (36)
and
!
E
e t =   _'E : (37)
i) E¢ ciency and Ramsey-Keynes conditions:
Replacing 'Q and 'R in (34) and (35) by their expressions in (31) and (32) gives
g'Q =  Q(l + LQ): (38)
and
g'R =
 (1  )RARR
AQl
 1   RLR: (39)
Log-di¤erentiating (31) with respect to time yields  gY +gAQ+( 1)gl  = g'Q+gAQ ;
which, together with (38) yields Ramsey-Keynes condition
 =  gY + gAQ + (  1)gl + Ql: (40)
Log-di¤erentiating (32) with respect to time yields g'Q+gAQ = g'R+gAR ; which, together
with (38), (39) and (4) yields
AQQ
ARR
=

(1  )R
Q
1=
; (41)
which is an e¢ ciency condition saying that marginal productivity of labour in both research
sectors is the same. For a similar condition, see condition (20) in Acemoglu (2002).
ii) Hotelling condition:
Log-di¤erentiating (33) with respect to time, we get  gY + gAR + (  1)gR    =
(

'S(1+))+ _'E
(1 )Y  ARR 1e t . Observe that (

'S(1 + )) = 'S _ since _'S = 0, from (36). Replacing
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'S and _'E by their expressions in (33) and (37), we get
 gY+gAR+( 1)gR  = ^

1  'E
(1  )(ARR=Y )R 1e t

  !
(1  )(ARR=Y )R 1E :
(42)
First, since Y = ARR[(AQQ=ARR) + (1   )]1= (which is (1) in the symmetric
case), and AQQ=ARR = [(1  )R=Q]1= (see (41)), we have (1   )(ARR=Y ) =
Q=(Q+ R): Moreover, we have gY = gAR + gR. This allows us to write  gY +gAR +
(  1)gR    =  gR   .
Second, integrating (37) gives 'E = 'E0  
R t
0
!
E e
 sds. Transversality condition
lim
t!+1'EE = 0 becomes limt!+1

'E0  
R t
0
!
E e
 sds

E0  
R t
0 Rsds

= 0: The second
term between brackets tends to a nite limit (which we can assume di¤erent from zero)
since the integral is nite (the stock of resource being nite). Thus 'E0 =
R +1
0
!
E e
 sds,
which gives 'E =
R +1
t
!
E e
 sds.
Third, from _E =  R we have gE =  R=E.
Finally, plugging these results into (42) yields the following Hotelling rule
gR =    ^

1  (Q + R)R
Q
Z +1
t
(!=E)e (s t)ds

  !(Q + R)
Q
gE : (43)
iii) Computation of the optimal solutions:
Computation of lo. Since AQQ=ARR is constant (from (41)), we have QLQ+ gQ =
RLR+ gR. However, we have already proved that gY = RLR+ gR (see ii) above). Thus,
gY = QLQ + gQ. Plugging this into (40) and using gQ = gl, we obtain the following
Ricatti di¤erential equation: _l = Ql2   l. In order to transform this equation into
a linear rst-order di¤erential equation, we consider the new variable z = 1=l, which
implies _z =   _l=l2. The Ricatti equation becomes _z =  Q + z, whose solution leads to
l = 1et(1=l0 Q=)+Q= : Using transversality condition limt !+1'QAQ = 0, we show that l
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immediately jumps to its steady-state level:
lo = =Q: (44)
Indeed, with formula (31), we get 'QAQ =

Q
(
AQQ
Y )
e t
h
et( 1l0  
Q
 ) +
Q

i
; where
AQQ=Y is constant. It turns out that transversality condititon lim
t !+1'QAQ = 0 is only
satised when l0 = =Q.
Computation of LoQ, L
o
R and g
o
Y . From (8), we know that L
o
R = 1   lo   LoQ.
Moreover, we have already seen that QLQ + gQ = RLR + gR. Taking into account the
fact that lo is a constant, we can easily express LoQ in terms of g
o
R. We obtain formula
(11). Then we can compute LoR in terms of g
o
R (see (12)). Since gY = QLQ + gQ, the
expression of goY follows (see (14)).
Appendix 2: Equilibrium
 Households behaviour.
The current value Hamiltonian of the households programme is
H = (1=") ln
R 1
0 c
"
jdj + ! lnE + (rb+ w +   
R 1
0 pjcjdj + T ), where  is the co-state
variable associated with b. The two conditions @H=@cj = 0 and @H=@b =   _ lead to
 = c" 1j = pj , where   =
R 1
0 c
"
jdj, and _= =   r.
From the rst condition, one gets c" 1j =c
" 1
k = pj=pk, for all j; k. Multiplying both
sides by p1 "k and rearranging, we obtain p
 "=(1 ")
k p
1=(1 ")
j cj = pkck. Summing on k nally
gives cj =
h
p
1=(" 1)
j
R 1
0 pkckdk
i
=
R 1
0 p
"=(" 1)
k dk.
Di¤erentiating the rst condition with respect to time gives g = ("  1)gcj   g   gpj .
Together with the second condition, this gives the following Ramsey-Keynes condition:
r = + (1  ")gcj + g  + gpj .
 Proof of the lemma.
35
From (24) we have gVQ =  gAQ =  QLQ. Then, using (28), where vQ = VQQLQ +
 Ql=AQ, one gets r =  QQl (which is the rate of return in green research).
Similarly, from (25) we obtain gVR =  gAR =  RLR. Formula (28), with vR =
VRRLR+ RpRR=AR, yields r =  RpRRR. Using the expression of pR given by (29),
pQ = 1= (see (19)), and Q = l (see (4)), we obtain pR = ((1  )l=R)(ARR=AQQ).
Plugging this formula in the expression of r, we get r = ((1  ) RRl=)(ARR=AQQ).
This is the rate of return in grey research.
Thus, we have two expressions of r, which allow us to get condition (30).
 Two preliminary results.
Technology Y = [(AQQ) + (1  )(ARR)]1= (which is (1) in the symmetric case)
can be written Y = AQQ[ + (1  )(AQQ=ARR) ]1= = ARR [z + (1  )]1= : Since
AQQ=ARR is constant from lemma 1, log-di¤erentiation with respect to time gives
gY = gAQ + gQ = gAR + gR: (45)
Second, from (29), we have (observe that, from (19), gpQ = 0)
gp = (  1)gY   gAQ + (1  )gQ = g + gpR + (  1)gY   gAR + (1  )gR: (46)
 Determination of l.
In the symmetric case, we have   = "gc. Thus, Ramsey-Keynes condition (18) becomes
r = + gc+ gp. Let us replace gp by ( 1)gY  gAQ +(1 )gQ (see equation (46)) and
recall that gY = gc, gY   gAQ = gQ = gl (see (45) and (4)) and r =  QQl (see proof of
lemma 1). We obtain +gl =  QQl, that is, _l =  QQl
2 l, which is a Ricatti di¤erential
equation. In order to transform this equation into a linear rst-order di¤erential equation,
we consider the new variable z = 1=l, which implies _z =   _l=l2. The Ricatti equation
36
becomes _z =   QQ + z, whose solution leads to l = 1et(1=l0  QQ=)+ QQ= . Using the
transversality condition of the households program, we can show, as we did in Appendix
1, that l immediately jumps to its steady-state level. Thus, one gets l = = QQ.
Note that we also obtain r = : this result come from the fact that we normalized
wage to one (see section 3.1). If we had normalized the price of consumption goods to one
in symmetric decentralized equilibrium, the interest rate would have been equal to + gY
(which is a more conventional nding).
 Determination of gR.
Log-di¤erentiating (29) with respect to time, and using (20) gives gp = g + ^ + r +
(  1)gY  gAR +(1 )gR. Plugging this expression in (18), and since gY   gAR = gR,
one gets gR =    ^  g .
 Labour in R&D.
From (45), and gQ = gl = 0, we have QLQ = RLR+gR. Since LR = 1 LQ = QQ,
one gets LQ =
R 
Q+R
  R QQ(Q+R)  
^+g
Q+R
. Then we obtain LeR =
Q+
Q+R
   Q(Q+R) +
^+g
Q+R
.
 Growth of output.
From (45), we have gY = gAQ = QLQ:
 Stock of environment.
From Et = E0 
R t
0 Rsds, and gR =   ^ g , one gets Et = E0 
R t
0 R0e
 (+^+g )sds =
E0 +
R0
+^+g

e (+^+g )t   1 : After di¤erentiation, we obtain the rate of growth of this
stock : gE = 1e(+^+g )t[1=gE0+1=(+^+g )] 1=(+^+g ) :
Appendix 3: Optimal environmental policy
 Preliminary result: marginal productivity of the non-renewable resource.
From (1) and (30), we have
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Yt = ARtRt [(AQtQt=ARtRt)
 + (1  )]1= = ARtRt [(1  )R=Q + 1  ]1=
Marginal productivity of the resource is @Yt=@Rt = (1   )Y 1 t ARtR 1t = (1  
)(ARtRt=Yt)
(Yt=Rt). Using the previous result, one gets @Yt=@Rt = [Q=(Q + R)] (Yt=Rt):
AssumeCt =  1, which corresponds to a decrease in extractionRt =  1=(@Yt=@Rt) =
[ (Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Yt). Suppose that this extraction is delayed until t + t, we have
Rt+t =  Rt = [(Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Yt).
 Impact on the environment.
First, remember that Et = E0 
R t
0 Psds. Between t and t+t, environmental quality is
improved: dEt;t+t = [(Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Yt). For any s 2 [t+t;+1[, environmental
quality is modied according to dEs =  ^ [(Q + R)=Q] (Rs=Ys): If ^ > 0, this is
harmful for environment, and if ^ < 0, this improves environmental quality.
 Social value of delaying extraction.
A change dEt corresponds to the following change in consumption (i.e., the marginal
rate of substitution): dCt = [ (@U=@E)=(@U=@C)] dEt
= [ (!=Et)=(1=Ct)] dEt = ( !Ct=Et)dEt.
On the interval [t; t + t], we get dCt;t+t = ( !Ct=Et)dEt;t+t
= ( !Ct=Et) [(Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Yt) = [ !(Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Et). From (7), we have
Rt=Et =  gE . Finally, we obtain dCt;t+t = [!(Q + R)=Q] gE :
On the interval [t + t;+1[, the total variation of utility is given by
 ^ [(Q + R)=Q] (Rt=Yt)
R +1
t+t(!=Es)e
 (s t)ds. Since @U=@Ct = 1=Ct = 1=Yt, the
corresponding change in consumption is dCt+t;+1 =  ^ [(Q + R)=Q]Rt
R +1
t+t(!=Es)e
 (s t)ds.
Observe that dCt;t+t + dCt+t;+1
= [!(Q + R)=Q] gE   ^ [(Q + R)=Q]Rt
R +1
t+t(!=Es)e
 (s t)ds, that is (assuming
that t ! 0), the optimal growth rate of the environmental tax given in proposition
4.
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Figure 1: Phase Diagram 
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Figure 2: Dynamics 
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